Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
X. SOURCES OF STATISTICS
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: the Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Taylor, Lenette S. The Supply for Tomorrow Must Not Fail: The Civil War of Captain Simon Perkins Jr., a Union Quartermaster. Kent: Kent State Press, 2004.
United States. Bureau of the Census. 1860 Federal Census of Population.
Wagner, Margaret E, Gallagher, Gary W., and Paul Finkelman. The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.
XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bacon, Benjamin. Sinews of War: How Technology, Industry, and Transportation Won the Civil War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997.
Ball, Douglas B. Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991.
Black, Robert C. The Railroads of the Confederacy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952.
Bradlee, Francis B. C. Blockade Running During the Civil War and Effect of Land and Water Transportation on the Confederacy. Salem, MA: Essex Institute, 1925.
Browning, Robert M. Success Is All That Was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War. Washington: Brassey's, 2002.
Carse, Robert. Blockade: the Civil War at Sea. New York: Rinehart, 1958.
Clark, John E. Jr. Railroads in the Civil War: the Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.
Estaville, Lawrence E. Confederate Neckties: Louisiana Railroads in the Civil War. Ruston, LA: McGinty Publications, 1989.
Fiske, John. The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1900.
Forsyth, Michael J. The Red River Campaign of 1864 and the Loss by the Confederacy of the Civil War. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002.
Gabel, Christopher R. Rails to Oblivion: the Battle of Confederate Railroads in the Civil War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command & General Staff Press, 2002.
Gates, Paul Wallace. Agriculture and the Civil War. New York: Knopf, 1965.
Goff, Richard D. Confederate Supply. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969.
Goff, Richard D. Logistics and Supply Problems of the Confederacy. Ann Arbor,MI: University Microfilms, 1972.
Horner, Dave. The Blockade-Runners: True Tales of Running the Yankee Blockade of the Confederate Coast. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968.
Johnson, Ludwell H. Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.
Lonn, Ella. Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy. New York: W. Neale, 1933.
Moore, Jerrold Northrop. Confederate Commissary General: Lucius Bellinger Northrop and the Subsistence Bureau of the Southern Army. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publications, 1996.
Nichols, James Lynn. The Confederate Quartermaster in the Trans-Mississippi. Austin: University of Texas, 1964.
Pratt, Fletcher. Civil War on Western Waters. New York: Holt, 1956.
Shea, William Land and Terrence J. Winschel. Vicksburg is the Key: the Struggle for the Mississippi River. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003.
Surdam, David G. Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001.
Titus, David E. The Failure of the Confederate Vicksburg Campaign. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1996.
Turner, George Edgar. Victory Rode the Rails: the Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972.
Weber, Thomas. The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-1865. New York: King's Crown Press, 1952.
Windham, William. Logistics in the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. University of Alabama Press, 1955.
Wise, Stephen R. Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988.
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
Showing posts with label Transportation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Transportation. Show all posts
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Friday, June 11, 2010
LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART IV
Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
VI. Civil War Era Water Transportation
Canal mileage in the US:
3,700 miles, mostly in the northeastern states
North: 3,182 (86%)
South: 518 (14%)
Exports:
North: $222,199,477
South: $27,145,466 (returns from AR, TN, and MS incomplete)
Imports:
North: $320,996,024
South: $14,654,129 (of that, $11,960,869 passed through New Orleans, revenue lost to the South during most of the war)
American vessels leaving US ports:
North: 10,260
South: 819
Foreign vessels leaving US ports:
North: 10,336
South: 220
Total tonnage, imports & exports:
North: 13,654,925
South: 737,901
Canals and steamboats were important modes of transport of persons and goods prior to 1850, but the explosive growth of railroads in the 1850s (from 9,000 miles of track to 30,000 miles in ten years) greatly lessened the importance of both those modes of transport. Rail transport was somewhat more expensive than those modes of transport, but was also both faster and more reliable than canal or river transport.
During 1865, the Quartermaster General of the Union Army owned or chartered 719 transport vessels for use on oceans or the Great Lakes. The Inland Transportation Division owned or chartered 352 barges, 91 steamers, and 139 boats for use on inland rivers. Enforcing the blockade of Southern ports required 600 naval vessels and 70,000 naval personnel.
Blockade Running During the Civil War
Was blockade running profitable? Yes! How successful were blockade runners? Five out of six successfully evaded the blockade. Does this mean that the blockade was not effective? No-- bales of cotton exported from Southern states were reduced from 10,000,000 total in the three years preceding the Civil War to 500,000 total from April 1861 to April 1865.
Blockade runners usually carried cotton on the outward voyage, exchanging it in Nassau, Bermuda, or Havana for weapons, goods, medicines, and foodstuffs, which were then sold on return to a Confederate port. Blockade running ships were usually painted dark gray or black, to help them blend into their surroundings at night and on overcast days.
The steamer Bermuda in late 1861 made a run from Savannah, Georgia, to Liverpool, England. It carried back 22 cannon of various bores with ammunition, 6,500 Enfield rifles, 200,000 Enfield cartridges, 6,000 pairs of army boots, 20,000 army blankets, 180 barrels of gunpowder, and large quantities of morphine, quinine, and other medicines. The cargo was purchased by the Confederate government for $1,000,000.
A blockade runner taking a steamer to England with 800 bales of cotton in 1864 could exchange the cotton for militarily useful items, sell those items back in the Confederacy, and earn $400,000 or more for his trouble. It was said that a runner who made two successful trips could pay for his steamer, material costs, and crew expenses, and still have enough left over to live a comfortable life for many years thereafter.
A blockade runner in 1864 bought $6,000 worth of foodstuffs in Nassau and then sold them to the Confederate Commissariat in Richmond for $27,000- a 450% return on investment.
A bag of salt selling for $1.25 in the North by mid-1864 could be sold for $60 in the South, a 5,000% return on investment.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
VI. Civil War Era Water Transportation
Canal mileage in the US:
3,700 miles, mostly in the northeastern states
North: 3,182 (86%)
South: 518 (14%)
Exports:
North: $222,199,477
South: $27,145,466 (returns from AR, TN, and MS incomplete)
Imports:
North: $320,996,024
South: $14,654,129 (of that, $11,960,869 passed through New Orleans, revenue lost to the South during most of the war)
American vessels leaving US ports:
North: 10,260
South: 819
Foreign vessels leaving US ports:
North: 10,336
South: 220
Total tonnage, imports & exports:
North: 13,654,925
South: 737,901
Canals and steamboats were important modes of transport of persons and goods prior to 1850, but the explosive growth of railroads in the 1850s (from 9,000 miles of track to 30,000 miles in ten years) greatly lessened the importance of both those modes of transport. Rail transport was somewhat more expensive than those modes of transport, but was also both faster and more reliable than canal or river transport.
During 1865, the Quartermaster General of the Union Army owned or chartered 719 transport vessels for use on oceans or the Great Lakes. The Inland Transportation Division owned or chartered 352 barges, 91 steamers, and 139 boats for use on inland rivers. Enforcing the blockade of Southern ports required 600 naval vessels and 70,000 naval personnel.
Blockade Running During the Civil War
Was blockade running profitable? Yes! How successful were blockade runners? Five out of six successfully evaded the blockade. Does this mean that the blockade was not effective? No-- bales of cotton exported from Southern states were reduced from 10,000,000 total in the three years preceding the Civil War to 500,000 total from April 1861 to April 1865.
Blockade runners usually carried cotton on the outward voyage, exchanging it in Nassau, Bermuda, or Havana for weapons, goods, medicines, and foodstuffs, which were then sold on return to a Confederate port. Blockade running ships were usually painted dark gray or black, to help them blend into their surroundings at night and on overcast days.
The steamer Bermuda in late 1861 made a run from Savannah, Georgia, to Liverpool, England. It carried back 22 cannon of various bores with ammunition, 6,500 Enfield rifles, 200,000 Enfield cartridges, 6,000 pairs of army boots, 20,000 army blankets, 180 barrels of gunpowder, and large quantities of morphine, quinine, and other medicines. The cargo was purchased by the Confederate government for $1,000,000.
A blockade runner taking a steamer to England with 800 bales of cotton in 1864 could exchange the cotton for militarily useful items, sell those items back in the Confederacy, and earn $400,000 or more for his trouble. It was said that a runner who made two successful trips could pay for his steamer, material costs, and crew expenses, and still have enough left over to live a comfortable life for many years thereafter.
A blockade runner in 1864 bought $6,000 worth of foodstuffs in Nassau and then sold them to the Confederate Commissariat in Richmond for $27,000- a 450% return on investment.
A bag of salt selling for $1.25 in the North by mid-1864 could be sold for $60 in the South, a 5,000% return on investment.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
Friday, June 4, 2010
LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART III
Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
V. ANIMAL & PEOPLE POWER
Animals
Horses in the US:
North: 4,417,130
South: 1,698,328
Mules in the US:
North: 328,890
South: 800,663
Oxen in the US:
North: 1,383,430
South: 856,645
Animals (horses, oxen, & mules) killed at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863):
North: 881
South: 619
Total: 1,500
Artillery horses according to regulations were to receive 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of grain per day, or 80 pounds of pasturage if dried foods were not available. Since an artillery regiment by regulations had 90 horses, it would have required 2,340 pounds of hay and grain per day to feed its horses (16,380 per week, or 70,200 pounds per month). When hay and grain were not available, an artillery regiment would have required 7,200 pounds of pasturage per day (50,400 per week, or 216,000 per month).
An average horse could on hard-paved fairly level roads pull 3,000 pounds 20-23 miles per day. That was reduced to 1,900 pounds on a macadamized road, and 1,100 pounds on a rough road. These figures were maximum possible loads: horses working in teams of four to six generally were pulling 1,500-2,000 pounds of supplies and equipment each. This meant that a wagon pulled by six horses could pull an average load weighing 9,000-12,000 pounds, but that total would need to be reduced accordingly if the animals were hauling their own hay and grain.
By mid-1863, the US Army required 500 new horses per day to replenish losses due to overwork, injury, or death. If that rate of loss had held steady through four years of war, the Union Army would have lost 730,000 horses to death, injury, or overwork. It seems safe to assume that the Confederate Army lost horses at somewhat more than about half the rate of the Union Army. This figure relates closely to those generated by the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, which estimates that at least one million horses died during the Civil War. The average Union Army cavalry horse served for four months before being rendered useless to the army. Supply and demand coupled with inflationary pressures increased the price of a good horse from $125 in 1861 to $185 in 1865. Losses of oxen and mules would have been substantially less than those of horses, partly because of the fewer overall numbers of such animals in service, and partly because such animals were not used for cavalry duties (usually, anyway-- mules were on occasion utilized temporarily as mounts for mounted infantry soldiers).
Shank's Mare
Soldiers on the march usually carried a load weighing about 45 pounds, although in a pinch they were expected to carry even more. Since the average Civil War soldier weighed 140 pounds, he was routinely expected to carry 1/3 his body weight while on the march. Items carried included musket, bayonet, and weapons cleaning equipment, 40 rounds of ammunition, 3 or 4 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat; shelter-tent half (another man carried the other half), ground sheet, and mess gear, plus any personal items like Bibles, playing cards, dice, etc.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
V. ANIMAL & PEOPLE POWER
Animals
Horses in the US:
North: 4,417,130
South: 1,698,328
Mules in the US:
North: 328,890
South: 800,663
Oxen in the US:
North: 1,383,430
South: 856,645
Animals (horses, oxen, & mules) killed at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863):
North: 881
South: 619
Total: 1,500
Artillery horses according to regulations were to receive 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of grain per day, or 80 pounds of pasturage if dried foods were not available. Since an artillery regiment by regulations had 90 horses, it would have required 2,340 pounds of hay and grain per day to feed its horses (16,380 per week, or 70,200 pounds per month). When hay and grain were not available, an artillery regiment would have required 7,200 pounds of pasturage per day (50,400 per week, or 216,000 per month).
An average horse could on hard-paved fairly level roads pull 3,000 pounds 20-23 miles per day. That was reduced to 1,900 pounds on a macadamized road, and 1,100 pounds on a rough road. These figures were maximum possible loads: horses working in teams of four to six generally were pulling 1,500-2,000 pounds of supplies and equipment each. This meant that a wagon pulled by six horses could pull an average load weighing 9,000-12,000 pounds, but that total would need to be reduced accordingly if the animals were hauling their own hay and grain.
By mid-1863, the US Army required 500 new horses per day to replenish losses due to overwork, injury, or death. If that rate of loss had held steady through four years of war, the Union Army would have lost 730,000 horses to death, injury, or overwork. It seems safe to assume that the Confederate Army lost horses at somewhat more than about half the rate of the Union Army. This figure relates closely to those generated by the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, which estimates that at least one million horses died during the Civil War. The average Union Army cavalry horse served for four months before being rendered useless to the army. Supply and demand coupled with inflationary pressures increased the price of a good horse from $125 in 1861 to $185 in 1865. Losses of oxen and mules would have been substantially less than those of horses, partly because of the fewer overall numbers of such animals in service, and partly because such animals were not used for cavalry duties (usually, anyway-- mules were on occasion utilized temporarily as mounts for mounted infantry soldiers).
Shank's Mare
Soldiers on the march usually carried a load weighing about 45 pounds, although in a pinch they were expected to carry even more. Since the average Civil War soldier weighed 140 pounds, he was routinely expected to carry 1/3 his body weight while on the march. Items carried included musket, bayonet, and weapons cleaning equipment, 40 rounds of ammunition, 3 or 4 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat; shelter-tent half (another man carried the other half), ground sheet, and mess gear, plus any personal items like Bibles, playing cards, dice, etc.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
Saturday, May 22, 2010
LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART I
Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
I. Civil War Era Geography & Population
Number of States:
North: 23, plus seven territories and District of Columbia
South: 11
Total Number Persons:
North: 22,339,989
South: 9,101,090
Total Black Persons:
North: 429,401 (slave); 355,310 (free); 784,711 (total)
South: 3,521,110 (slave); 132,760 (free); 3,653,870 (total)
The pool of persons liable for military service in the North was four times greater than the pool of eligibles in the South, even before free blacks are included in the totals. Also, immigration continued in the North during the war (more than 500,000 persons immigrated during 1861-1864), while the Union naval blockade halted most immigration to Southern states throughout the war.
Of the 25 largest cities in the US in 1860, only three were in seceding states: No. 6, New Orleans, LA; No. 22, Charleston, SC; and No. 25, Richmond, VA.
Because of advances in public schooling, only 6% of free adults in the North were illiterate in 1860. In the South public schooling had not yet made wide inroads, and the failure was reflected in Southern literacy rates- nearly 50% of free Southern adults were illiterate in 1860.
II. Civil War Era Agriculture
Cultivated Land:
North: 105,000,000 acres
South: 57,000,000 acres
Cash Value of Farms, Farm Dwellings, Livestock, & Farm Equipment:
North: $5,056,151,204
South: $1,579,349,508
Cash Value of Farm Implements, Machinery, & Livestock:
North: $930,413,926
South: $397,072,820
Amount of Farm Equipment per Agricultural Worker:
North: $66.00
South: $38.00
Percentage of Labor Force Engaged in Agriculture:
North: 40%
South: 84%
Farm production in the North actually increased during the war, in spite of the loss of thousands of farmers to the Union Army. Bumper crops in 1861 and 1862 actually meant that food was exported by the North in large quantities. The number of hogs butchered yearly in Chicago increased from 270,000 in 1861 to 900,000 in 1865. New farm machinery like mowers, horse rakes, separators, sowers, cultivators, and drills allowed farm wives to manage many of the chores that had recently required the physical strength of one or more men to accomplish. The US Department of Agriculture was formed during the war to help farmers produce larger crops with less labor.
Principal southern crops were cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar. Continuous planting of cotton and tobacco tended to wear out the soil, leading to nitrogen depletion and lower crop yields. Also, the two major crops, cotton and tobacco, were not edible, and the Union blockade hindered Southern efforts to use exports of those crops to secure funds necessary to purchase war materials. The cotton-producing states kept only 5% of their crops for use by Southern mills- 70% was exported, mostly to England, and 25% was sent to mills in the North. Middlemen skimmed part of the profit right off the top, for insurance, warehousing, and shipping. The role of middlemen didn't stop there, of course- cotton goods being returned from English mills were usually sent to Northern ports, then shipped from there by rail to Southern markets.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
I. Civil War Era Geography & Population
Number of States:
North: 23, plus seven territories and District of Columbia
South: 11
Total Number Persons:
North: 22,339,989
South: 9,101,090
Total Black Persons:
North: 429,401 (slave); 355,310 (free); 784,711 (total)
South: 3,521,110 (slave); 132,760 (free); 3,653,870 (total)
The pool of persons liable for military service in the North was four times greater than the pool of eligibles in the South, even before free blacks are included in the totals. Also, immigration continued in the North during the war (more than 500,000 persons immigrated during 1861-1864), while the Union naval blockade halted most immigration to Southern states throughout the war.
Of the 25 largest cities in the US in 1860, only three were in seceding states: No. 6, New Orleans, LA; No. 22, Charleston, SC; and No. 25, Richmond, VA.
Because of advances in public schooling, only 6% of free adults in the North were illiterate in 1860. In the South public schooling had not yet made wide inroads, and the failure was reflected in Southern literacy rates- nearly 50% of free Southern adults were illiterate in 1860.
II. Civil War Era Agriculture
Cultivated Land:
North: 105,000,000 acres
South: 57,000,000 acres
Cash Value of Farms, Farm Dwellings, Livestock, & Farm Equipment:
North: $5,056,151,204
South: $1,579,349,508
Cash Value of Farm Implements, Machinery, & Livestock:
North: $930,413,926
South: $397,072,820
Amount of Farm Equipment per Agricultural Worker:
North: $66.00
South: $38.00
Percentage of Labor Force Engaged in Agriculture:
North: 40%
South: 84%
Farm production in the North actually increased during the war, in spite of the loss of thousands of farmers to the Union Army. Bumper crops in 1861 and 1862 actually meant that food was exported by the North in large quantities. The number of hogs butchered yearly in Chicago increased from 270,000 in 1861 to 900,000 in 1865. New farm machinery like mowers, horse rakes, separators, sowers, cultivators, and drills allowed farm wives to manage many of the chores that had recently required the physical strength of one or more men to accomplish. The US Department of Agriculture was formed during the war to help farmers produce larger crops with less labor.
Principal southern crops were cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar. Continuous planting of cotton and tobacco tended to wear out the soil, leading to nitrogen depletion and lower crop yields. Also, the two major crops, cotton and tobacco, were not edible, and the Union blockade hindered Southern efforts to use exports of those crops to secure funds necessary to purchase war materials. The cotton-producing states kept only 5% of their crops for use by Southern mills- 70% was exported, mostly to England, and 25% was sent to mills in the North. Middlemen skimmed part of the profit right off the top, for insurance, warehousing, and shipping. The role of middlemen didn't stop there, of course- cotton goods being returned from English mills were usually sent to Northern ports, then shipped from there by rail to Southern markets.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)