Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
VI. Civil War Era Water Transportation
Canal mileage in the US:
3,700 miles, mostly in the northeastern states
North: 3,182 (86%)
South: 518 (14%)
Exports:
North: $222,199,477
South: $27,145,466 (returns from AR, TN, and MS incomplete)
Imports:
North: $320,996,024
South: $14,654,129 (of that, $11,960,869 passed through New Orleans, revenue lost to the South during most of the war)
American vessels leaving US ports:
North: 10,260
South: 819
Foreign vessels leaving US ports:
North: 10,336
South: 220
Total tonnage, imports & exports:
North: 13,654,925
South: 737,901
Canals and steamboats were important modes of transport of persons and goods prior to 1850, but the explosive growth of railroads in the 1850s (from 9,000 miles of track to 30,000 miles in ten years) greatly lessened the importance of both those modes of transport. Rail transport was somewhat more expensive than those modes of transport, but was also both faster and more reliable than canal or river transport.
During 1865, the Quartermaster General of the Union Army owned or chartered 719 transport vessels for use on oceans or the Great Lakes. The Inland Transportation Division owned or chartered 352 barges, 91 steamers, and 139 boats for use on inland rivers. Enforcing the blockade of Southern ports required 600 naval vessels and 70,000 naval personnel.
Blockade Running During the Civil War
Was blockade running profitable? Yes! How successful were blockade runners? Five out of six successfully evaded the blockade. Does this mean that the blockade was not effective? No-- bales of cotton exported from Southern states were reduced from 10,000,000 total in the three years preceding the Civil War to 500,000 total from April 1861 to April 1865.
Blockade runners usually carried cotton on the outward voyage, exchanging it in Nassau, Bermuda, or Havana for weapons, goods, medicines, and foodstuffs, which were then sold on return to a Confederate port. Blockade running ships were usually painted dark gray or black, to help them blend into their surroundings at night and on overcast days.
The steamer Bermuda in late 1861 made a run from Savannah, Georgia, to Liverpool, England. It carried back 22 cannon of various bores with ammunition, 6,500 Enfield rifles, 200,000 Enfield cartridges, 6,000 pairs of army boots, 20,000 army blankets, 180 barrels of gunpowder, and large quantities of morphine, quinine, and other medicines. The cargo was purchased by the Confederate government for $1,000,000.
A blockade runner taking a steamer to England with 800 bales of cotton in 1864 could exchange the cotton for militarily useful items, sell those items back in the Confederacy, and earn $400,000 or more for his trouble. It was said that a runner who made two successful trips could pay for his steamer, material costs, and crew expenses, and still have enough left over to live a comfortable life for many years thereafter.
A blockade runner in 1864 bought $6,000 worth of foodstuffs in Nassau and then sold them to the Confederate Commissariat in Richmond for $27,000- a 450% return on investment.
A bag of salt selling for $1.25 in the North by mid-1864 could be sold for $60 in the South, a 5,000% return on investment.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
Showing posts with label Logistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Logistics. Show all posts
Friday, June 11, 2010
Friday, June 4, 2010
LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART III
Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
V. ANIMAL & PEOPLE POWER
Animals
Horses in the US:
North: 4,417,130
South: 1,698,328
Mules in the US:
North: 328,890
South: 800,663
Oxen in the US:
North: 1,383,430
South: 856,645
Animals (horses, oxen, & mules) killed at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863):
North: 881
South: 619
Total: 1,500
Artillery horses according to regulations were to receive 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of grain per day, or 80 pounds of pasturage if dried foods were not available. Since an artillery regiment by regulations had 90 horses, it would have required 2,340 pounds of hay and grain per day to feed its horses (16,380 per week, or 70,200 pounds per month). When hay and grain were not available, an artillery regiment would have required 7,200 pounds of pasturage per day (50,400 per week, or 216,000 per month).
An average horse could on hard-paved fairly level roads pull 3,000 pounds 20-23 miles per day. That was reduced to 1,900 pounds on a macadamized road, and 1,100 pounds on a rough road. These figures were maximum possible loads: horses working in teams of four to six generally were pulling 1,500-2,000 pounds of supplies and equipment each. This meant that a wagon pulled by six horses could pull an average load weighing 9,000-12,000 pounds, but that total would need to be reduced accordingly if the animals were hauling their own hay and grain.
By mid-1863, the US Army required 500 new horses per day to replenish losses due to overwork, injury, or death. If that rate of loss had held steady through four years of war, the Union Army would have lost 730,000 horses to death, injury, or overwork. It seems safe to assume that the Confederate Army lost horses at somewhat more than about half the rate of the Union Army. This figure relates closely to those generated by the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, which estimates that at least one million horses died during the Civil War. The average Union Army cavalry horse served for four months before being rendered useless to the army. Supply and demand coupled with inflationary pressures increased the price of a good horse from $125 in 1861 to $185 in 1865. Losses of oxen and mules would have been substantially less than those of horses, partly because of the fewer overall numbers of such animals in service, and partly because such animals were not used for cavalry duties (usually, anyway-- mules were on occasion utilized temporarily as mounts for mounted infantry soldiers).
Shank's Mare
Soldiers on the march usually carried a load weighing about 45 pounds, although in a pinch they were expected to carry even more. Since the average Civil War soldier weighed 140 pounds, he was routinely expected to carry 1/3 his body weight while on the march. Items carried included musket, bayonet, and weapons cleaning equipment, 40 rounds of ammunition, 3 or 4 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat; shelter-tent half (another man carried the other half), ground sheet, and mess gear, plus any personal items like Bibles, playing cards, dice, etc.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
V. ANIMAL & PEOPLE POWER
Animals
Horses in the US:
North: 4,417,130
South: 1,698,328
Mules in the US:
North: 328,890
South: 800,663
Oxen in the US:
North: 1,383,430
South: 856,645
Animals (horses, oxen, & mules) killed at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863):
North: 881
South: 619
Total: 1,500
Artillery horses according to regulations were to receive 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of grain per day, or 80 pounds of pasturage if dried foods were not available. Since an artillery regiment by regulations had 90 horses, it would have required 2,340 pounds of hay and grain per day to feed its horses (16,380 per week, or 70,200 pounds per month). When hay and grain were not available, an artillery regiment would have required 7,200 pounds of pasturage per day (50,400 per week, or 216,000 per month).
An average horse could on hard-paved fairly level roads pull 3,000 pounds 20-23 miles per day. That was reduced to 1,900 pounds on a macadamized road, and 1,100 pounds on a rough road. These figures were maximum possible loads: horses working in teams of four to six generally were pulling 1,500-2,000 pounds of supplies and equipment each. This meant that a wagon pulled by six horses could pull an average load weighing 9,000-12,000 pounds, but that total would need to be reduced accordingly if the animals were hauling their own hay and grain.
By mid-1863, the US Army required 500 new horses per day to replenish losses due to overwork, injury, or death. If that rate of loss had held steady through four years of war, the Union Army would have lost 730,000 horses to death, injury, or overwork. It seems safe to assume that the Confederate Army lost horses at somewhat more than about half the rate of the Union Army. This figure relates closely to those generated by the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, which estimates that at least one million horses died during the Civil War. The average Union Army cavalry horse served for four months before being rendered useless to the army. Supply and demand coupled with inflationary pressures increased the price of a good horse from $125 in 1861 to $185 in 1865. Losses of oxen and mules would have been substantially less than those of horses, partly because of the fewer overall numbers of such animals in service, and partly because such animals were not used for cavalry duties (usually, anyway-- mules were on occasion utilized temporarily as mounts for mounted infantry soldiers).
Shank's Mare
Soldiers on the march usually carried a load weighing about 45 pounds, although in a pinch they were expected to carry even more. Since the average Civil War soldier weighed 140 pounds, he was routinely expected to carry 1/3 his body weight while on the march. Items carried included musket, bayonet, and weapons cleaning equipment, 40 rounds of ammunition, 3 or 4 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat; shelter-tent half (another man carried the other half), ground sheet, and mess gear, plus any personal items like Bibles, playing cards, dice, etc.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
Saturday, May 22, 2010
LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART I
Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
I. Civil War Era Geography & Population
Number of States:
North: 23, plus seven territories and District of Columbia
South: 11
Total Number Persons:
North: 22,339,989
South: 9,101,090
Total Black Persons:
North: 429,401 (slave); 355,310 (free); 784,711 (total)
South: 3,521,110 (slave); 132,760 (free); 3,653,870 (total)
The pool of persons liable for military service in the North was four times greater than the pool of eligibles in the South, even before free blacks are included in the totals. Also, immigration continued in the North during the war (more than 500,000 persons immigrated during 1861-1864), while the Union naval blockade halted most immigration to Southern states throughout the war.
Of the 25 largest cities in the US in 1860, only three were in seceding states: No. 6, New Orleans, LA; No. 22, Charleston, SC; and No. 25, Richmond, VA.
Because of advances in public schooling, only 6% of free adults in the North were illiterate in 1860. In the South public schooling had not yet made wide inroads, and the failure was reflected in Southern literacy rates- nearly 50% of free Southern adults were illiterate in 1860.
II. Civil War Era Agriculture
Cultivated Land:
North: 105,000,000 acres
South: 57,000,000 acres
Cash Value of Farms, Farm Dwellings, Livestock, & Farm Equipment:
North: $5,056,151,204
South: $1,579,349,508
Cash Value of Farm Implements, Machinery, & Livestock:
North: $930,413,926
South: $397,072,820
Amount of Farm Equipment per Agricultural Worker:
North: $66.00
South: $38.00
Percentage of Labor Force Engaged in Agriculture:
North: 40%
South: 84%
Farm production in the North actually increased during the war, in spite of the loss of thousands of farmers to the Union Army. Bumper crops in 1861 and 1862 actually meant that food was exported by the North in large quantities. The number of hogs butchered yearly in Chicago increased from 270,000 in 1861 to 900,000 in 1865. New farm machinery like mowers, horse rakes, separators, sowers, cultivators, and drills allowed farm wives to manage many of the chores that had recently required the physical strength of one or more men to accomplish. The US Department of Agriculture was formed during the war to help farmers produce larger crops with less labor.
Principal southern crops were cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar. Continuous planting of cotton and tobacco tended to wear out the soil, leading to nitrogen depletion and lower crop yields. Also, the two major crops, cotton and tobacco, were not edible, and the Union blockade hindered Southern efforts to use exports of those crops to secure funds necessary to purchase war materials. The cotton-producing states kept only 5% of their crops for use by Southern mills- 70% was exported, mostly to England, and 25% was sent to mills in the North. Middlemen skimmed part of the profit right off the top, for insurance, warehousing, and shipping. The role of middlemen didn't stop there, of course- cotton goods being returned from English mills were usually sent to Northern ports, then shipped from there by rail to Southern markets.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
I. Civil War Era Geography & Population
Number of States:
North: 23, plus seven territories and District of Columbia
South: 11
Total Number Persons:
North: 22,339,989
South: 9,101,090
Total Black Persons:
North: 429,401 (slave); 355,310 (free); 784,711 (total)
South: 3,521,110 (slave); 132,760 (free); 3,653,870 (total)
The pool of persons liable for military service in the North was four times greater than the pool of eligibles in the South, even before free blacks are included in the totals. Also, immigration continued in the North during the war (more than 500,000 persons immigrated during 1861-1864), while the Union naval blockade halted most immigration to Southern states throughout the war.
Of the 25 largest cities in the US in 1860, only three were in seceding states: No. 6, New Orleans, LA; No. 22, Charleston, SC; and No. 25, Richmond, VA.
Because of advances in public schooling, only 6% of free adults in the North were illiterate in 1860. In the South public schooling had not yet made wide inroads, and the failure was reflected in Southern literacy rates- nearly 50% of free Southern adults were illiterate in 1860.
II. Civil War Era Agriculture
Cultivated Land:
North: 105,000,000 acres
South: 57,000,000 acres
Cash Value of Farms, Farm Dwellings, Livestock, & Farm Equipment:
North: $5,056,151,204
South: $1,579,349,508
Cash Value of Farm Implements, Machinery, & Livestock:
North: $930,413,926
South: $397,072,820
Amount of Farm Equipment per Agricultural Worker:
North: $66.00
South: $38.00
Percentage of Labor Force Engaged in Agriculture:
North: 40%
South: 84%
Farm production in the North actually increased during the war, in spite of the loss of thousands of farmers to the Union Army. Bumper crops in 1861 and 1862 actually meant that food was exported by the North in large quantities. The number of hogs butchered yearly in Chicago increased from 270,000 in 1861 to 900,000 in 1865. New farm machinery like mowers, horse rakes, separators, sowers, cultivators, and drills allowed farm wives to manage many of the chores that had recently required the physical strength of one or more men to accomplish. The US Department of Agriculture was formed during the war to help farmers produce larger crops with less labor.
Principal southern crops were cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar. Continuous planting of cotton and tobacco tended to wear out the soil, leading to nitrogen depletion and lower crop yields. Also, the two major crops, cotton and tobacco, were not edible, and the Union blockade hindered Southern efforts to use exports of those crops to secure funds necessary to purchase war materials. The cotton-producing states kept only 5% of their crops for use by Southern mills- 70% was exported, mostly to England, and 25% was sent to mills in the North. Middlemen skimmed part of the profit right off the top, for insurance, warehousing, and shipping. The role of middlemen didn't stop there, of course- cotton goods being returned from English mills were usually sent to Northern ports, then shipped from there by rail to Southern markets.
[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]
Thursday, December 17, 2009
HORNS OF THE BULL, PART II
Horns of the Bull: British Tragedy and Triumph at Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift
PART II
The British Army: The British Army in 1878-1879 had neither the prestige nor the political clout of the Royal Navy. Conditions for enlisted men were abysmal, and the pay exceedingly low. Since there was no conscription at that time, enlisted recruits generally were men who had few other options. Men enlisted for six years, with an additional six-year reserve commitment. British regiments consisted (on paper at least) of two battalions-- one at a home depot in Great Britain, while its partner battalion was deployed overseas. The army in 1878, however, was small enough that in some instances both battalions of a regiment were in fact overseas-- the 24th Regiment of Foot was unusual, however, in that both its 1st and 2nd Battalions were deployed in the Zululand Campaign.
British troops were supplemented with Natal volunteer units and the Natal Native Contingent, which was formed with native levies. Chelmsford had eight Natal volunteer units, and seven Natal Native Contingent battalions at his disposal, and also had 1,200 men of the volunteer Frontier Light Horse available. The problem with his Natal volunteer and Native Contingent units, of course, was that they had neither the training nor the discipline of his British regulars.
British Weapons: The British Army employed the Martini-Henry .45 caliber single-shot, breech-loading, lever-action rifle. It was a reliable and accurate weapon, capable in the hands of an expert marksman of downing a target at 1,000 yards, and rear-sighted for a firing distance of 400 yards. Its muzzle velocity was 375 yards, or 1/5 of a mile, per second. It fired a soft lead bullet that flattened on impact, wreaking havoc on bones and soft tissue. The Martini-Henry rifle was used in combination with a 21 ½ inch bayonet known as a "lunger."
British Strategy and Tactics: Lord Chelmsford, senior commander of British forces in Zululand, elected to divide his forces and ordered them to advance and then converge on Cethswayo's main homestead. During the advance, they were to destroy as many Zulu amakhanda as possible, thus limiting the capacity of the Zulu to carry on a military campaign of any length. Chelmsford hoped to provoke an attack on open level ground, where it was assumed that British military discipline and firepower would more than compensate for British inferiority in numbers (Chelmsford had 16,000 men, including a not-so-reliable as he might have hoped native contingent, while Cethswayo had at least 40,000 men at his disposal, nearly 30,000 of whom were estimated by reliable observers to have been mustered by Cethswayo for his war with the British). This was ironic, in that Cethswayo also hoped for a decisive battle on open level ground, where he thought Zulu superior numbers and Shaka's Horns of the Bull tactics could inflict a telling defeat on the British. He specifically cautioned his war chiefs, however, against attacking entrenched British troops, for Cethswayo thought that taking such a strong position, while possible, would prove too costly for the Zulu.
Chelmsford's main columns crossed into Zululand at Rorke's Drift, while a much smaller unit under Colonel Charles Pearson crossed into Zululand at the Lower Drift near the mouth of the Tugela River. Some British regulars were left behind in Natal, partly to guard against Zulu incursions, and partly to keep an eye on the Boers. British intentions were painfully obvious to the Boers, many of whom then refused to take any part in the British invasion of Zululand.
British supplies had to transported by oxen, who could only move eleven miles per day on good roads in good weather conditions. Chelmsford had no system of supply depots, so each of his columns was obliged to carry all of it own food and equipment, and from its own men to supply a guard for its supply train.
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
tpearson@slpl.org
http://www.slpl.org/
Link to our other indexes and bibliographies:
http://previous.slpl.org/libsrc/lisindex.htm
Copyright © 2009 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
PART II
The British Army: The British Army in 1878-1879 had neither the prestige nor the political clout of the Royal Navy. Conditions for enlisted men were abysmal, and the pay exceedingly low. Since there was no conscription at that time, enlisted recruits generally were men who had few other options. Men enlisted for six years, with an additional six-year reserve commitment. British regiments consisted (on paper at least) of two battalions-- one at a home depot in Great Britain, while its partner battalion was deployed overseas. The army in 1878, however, was small enough that in some instances both battalions of a regiment were in fact overseas-- the 24th Regiment of Foot was unusual, however, in that both its 1st and 2nd Battalions were deployed in the Zululand Campaign.
British troops were supplemented with Natal volunteer units and the Natal Native Contingent, which was formed with native levies. Chelmsford had eight Natal volunteer units, and seven Natal Native Contingent battalions at his disposal, and also had 1,200 men of the volunteer Frontier Light Horse available. The problem with his Natal volunteer and Native Contingent units, of course, was that they had neither the training nor the discipline of his British regulars.
British Weapons: The British Army employed the Martini-Henry .45 caliber single-shot, breech-loading, lever-action rifle. It was a reliable and accurate weapon, capable in the hands of an expert marksman of downing a target at 1,000 yards, and rear-sighted for a firing distance of 400 yards. Its muzzle velocity was 375 yards, or 1/5 of a mile, per second. It fired a soft lead bullet that flattened on impact, wreaking havoc on bones and soft tissue. The Martini-Henry rifle was used in combination with a 21 ½ inch bayonet known as a "lunger."
British Strategy and Tactics: Lord Chelmsford, senior commander of British forces in Zululand, elected to divide his forces and ordered them to advance and then converge on Cethswayo's main homestead. During the advance, they were to destroy as many Zulu amakhanda as possible, thus limiting the capacity of the Zulu to carry on a military campaign of any length. Chelmsford hoped to provoke an attack on open level ground, where it was assumed that British military discipline and firepower would more than compensate for British inferiority in numbers (Chelmsford had 16,000 men, including a not-so-reliable as he might have hoped native contingent, while Cethswayo had at least 40,000 men at his disposal, nearly 30,000 of whom were estimated by reliable observers to have been mustered by Cethswayo for his war with the British). This was ironic, in that Cethswayo also hoped for a decisive battle on open level ground, where he thought Zulu superior numbers and Shaka's Horns of the Bull tactics could inflict a telling defeat on the British. He specifically cautioned his war chiefs, however, against attacking entrenched British troops, for Cethswayo thought that taking such a strong position, while possible, would prove too costly for the Zulu.
Chelmsford's main columns crossed into Zululand at Rorke's Drift, while a much smaller unit under Colonel Charles Pearson crossed into Zululand at the Lower Drift near the mouth of the Tugela River. Some British regulars were left behind in Natal, partly to guard against Zulu incursions, and partly to keep an eye on the Boers. British intentions were painfully obvious to the Boers, many of whom then refused to take any part in the British invasion of Zululand.
British supplies had to transported by oxen, who could only move eleven miles per day on good roads in good weather conditions. Chelmsford had no system of supply depots, so each of his columns was obliged to carry all of it own food and equipment, and from its own men to supply a guard for its supply train.
Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library
tpearson@slpl.org
http://www.slpl.org/
Link to our other indexes and bibliographies:
http://previous.slpl.org/libsrc/lisindex.htm
Copyright © 2009 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.
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