LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART V

Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.


VII. The Quartermaster Bureau During the Civil War

Union Army logistical support was assigned to four departments:

Quartermaster General: clothing, equipment, animals, forage, transportation, and housing;
Commissary General: rations;
Chief of Ordnance: weapons, ammunition, and related equipment; and
Surgeon General: medical supplies, evacuation, treatment, and hospitalization.

Union Army major supply depots were located in Boston; New York City; Philadelphia; Baltimore; Washington, DC; Cincinnati; Louisville; St. Louis; Chicago; New Orleans; and San Francisco. The Confederate Army had major supply depots at Richmond; Raleigh; Atlanta; Little Rock; San Antonio; Staunton, VA; Columbus, GA; Huntsville, AL; Montgomery, AL; Jackson, MS; and Alexandria, LA. Supply depots procured supplies from commercial vendors and then repacked or assembled them to make them ready for shipment to advance and temporary supply bases. Advance and temporary supply bases could be established as needed to support operations in the field. Supply depots and advance and temporary supply bases were commanded by members of the Quartermaster Bureau, usually captains in rank but sometimes men of higher rank or even non-commissioned officers could be assigned the job in an emergency.

Non-perishable goods and commodities were procured from responsible low bidders by supply depots. Perishable goods and commodities were procured where the troops were operating when possible. Armies in the field were accompanied when practicable by herds of cattle that were slaughtered and distributed to the men as needed.

Each regiment in the field had a regimental quartermaster, regimental commissary officer, and a regimental ordnance officer. Each of those men was responsible for submitting requisitions for his supplies and transport of those supplies, for issuing his supplies, and for managing the transport of his supplies. These officers were usually men selected from the regiment's officers, and had no special training or expertise in logistics or transportation. On-the-job training was definitely the order of the day!

Transportation problems faced by quartermasters included:

1. Unconnected railroads that often used tracks of different gauges;
2. Bad roads made worse by heavy rain;
3. Rivers that could be too shallow to navigate at certain times of year, and too high to ford safely at others;
4. Disruption by rebel armies, cavalry, and guerrillas of lines of supply and communications; and
5. Competition for goods and cargo space with commercial vendors.

Labor problems faced by quartermasters included:

1. Quartermaster's duties were mentally complex and physically demanding, yet quartermasters learned their duties on the job, were burdened with onerous paperwork requirements, were frequently transferred, and were rarely promoted;
2. War effort's voracious appetite for manpower made it difficult to procure the services of experienced civilian clerks and white laborers, so free blacks were routinely employed as laborers and teamsters, and slaves were sometimes pressed into service in those same capacities;
3. Civilian and military personnel were often laid low by debilitating diseases like malaria that were endemic to many of the Southern states; and
4. A parsimonious Congress that made no effort to make available on a timely basis funds for payment of civilian suppliers and employees.

Amounts of supplies & equipment handled by quartermasters:

1. A quartermaster at the Pittsburg Landing supply depot in Tennessee in 1862 received almost eighteen million pounds of forage in a twenty-nine-day period.
2. A quartermaster's replacement at the supply depot at Eastport, Mississippi signed receipts for stores on hand that included 2.8 million pounds of corn, 1.9 million pounds of oats, 1.3 million pounds of hay, and 59,000 pounds of straw. 3. During a three-month period at the Nashville supply depot in 1863, a quartermaster dispensed nearly 3.5 million dollars to the holders of 9,000 overdue vouchers. Yet most quartermasters held the relatively lowly rank of captain during their entire time in service.

Paperwork requirements of Union Army quartermasters:

1. Nine monthly reports, each of which had to include nine different lengthy forms;
2. Three quarterly reports, each of which had to include three mandatory and two optional returns (quartermasters at major depots filled out an additional mandatory return);
3. All returns had to be documented with abstracts and vouchers, and vouchers accounting for lost, stolen, or destroyed property had to be sworn before a justice of the peace or designated military officer;
4. Additionally, the 1862 effort to root out corruption in the Quartermaster Bureau resulted in a requirement that quartermasters make three copies of their reports--one to be sent directly to the Treasury Department, one for Quartermaster General Meig's office, and one for the quartermaster to keep for his own protection in case of subsequent inquiries by the Army or the Treasury Department; and
5. Quartermasters had to account for lost, stolen, and destroyed property both during and after the war. In 1869, as the result of a Treasury Department audit of his wartime accounts, one former Union Army quartermaster received a bill for items unaccounted for. The amount that Treasury claimed he owed was $297,926.18, a truly jaw-dropping amount in those days. Luckily, he was able to resolve part of the amount owed with a notarized statement of his recollection of the final disposition of certain materials, but erasing the rest of the amount due required the calling in of a few political favors.

A six-months' supply of forms for one regiment consisted of:

1 Guard Report Book
1 Consolidated Morning Report Book
10 Company Morning Report Books
100 Consolidated Morning Reports
2 lists of Rolls, Returns, etc. to be made out by Company Commander
6 Field and Staff Muster Rolls
6 Muster Rolls of Hospital
18 Muster and Payrolls, Hospital
60 Company Muster Rolls
180 Company Muster and Payrolls
12 Regimental Returns
60 Company Monthly Returns
20 Returns of Men Joined Company
6 Quarterly Regimental Returns of Deceased Soldiers
30 Quarterly Company Returns of Deceased Soldiers
2 Annual Returns of Casualties
40 Descriptive Lists
100 Non-Commissioned Officer's Warrants

[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]

Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library

LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART III

Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.


V. ANIMAL & PEOPLE POWER

Animals

Horses in the US:
North: 4,417,130
South: 1,698,328

Mules in the US:
North: 328,890
South: 800,663

Oxen in the US:
North: 1,383,430
South: 856,645

Animals (horses, oxen, & mules) killed at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863):
North: 881
South: 619
Total: 1,500

Artillery horses according to regulations were to receive 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of grain per day, or 80 pounds of pasturage if dried foods were not available. Since an artillery regiment by regulations had 90 horses, it would have required 2,340 pounds of hay and grain per day to feed its horses (16,380 per week, or 70,200 pounds per month). When hay and grain were not available, an artillery regiment would have required 7,200 pounds of pasturage per day (50,400 per week, or 216,000 per month).

An average horse could on hard-paved fairly level roads pull 3,000 pounds 20-23 miles per day. That was reduced to 1,900 pounds on a macadamized road, and 1,100 pounds on a rough road. These figures were maximum possible loads: horses working in teams of four to six generally were pulling 1,500-2,000 pounds of supplies and equipment each. This meant that a wagon pulled by six horses could pull an average load weighing 9,000-12,000 pounds, but that total would need to be reduced accordingly if the animals were hauling their own hay and grain.

By mid-1863, the US Army required 500 new horses per day to replenish losses due to overwork, injury, or death. If that rate of loss had held steady through four years of war, the Union Army would have lost 730,000 horses to death, injury, or overwork. It seems safe to assume that the Confederate Army lost horses at somewhat more than about half the rate of the Union Army. This figure relates closely to those generated by the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, which estimates that at least one million horses died during the Civil War. The average Union Army cavalry horse served for four months before being rendered useless to the army. Supply and demand coupled with inflationary pressures increased the price of a good horse from $125 in 1861 to $185 in 1865. Losses of oxen and mules would have been substantially less than those of horses, partly because of the fewer overall numbers of such animals in service, and partly because such animals were not used for cavalry duties (usually, anyway-- mules were on occasion utilized temporarily as mounts for mounted infantry soldiers).

Shank's Mare

Soldiers on the march usually carried a load weighing about 45 pounds, although in a pinch they were expected to carry even more. Since the average Civil War soldier weighed 140 pounds, he was routinely expected to carry 1/3 his body weight while on the march. Items carried included musket, bayonet, and weapons cleaning equipment, 40 rounds of ammunition, 3 or 4 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat; shelter-tent half (another man carried the other half), ground sheet, and mess gear, plus any personal items like Bibles, playing cards, dice, etc.

[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]

Thomas A. Pearson, Reference Librarian
Special Collections Department
St. Louis Public Library

LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, PART I

Copyright © 2006 by St. Louis Public Library. All rights reserved.


I. Civil War Era Geography & Population

Number of States:

North: 23, plus seven territories and District of Columbia

South: 11

Total Number Persons:

North: 22,339,989

South: 9,101,090

Total Black Persons:

North: 429,401 (slave); 355,310 (free); 784,711 (total)

South: 3,521,110 (slave); 132,760 (free); 3,653,870 (total)

The pool of persons liable for military service in the North was four times greater than the pool of eligibles in the South, even before free blacks are included in the totals. Also, immigration continued in the North during the war (more than 500,000 persons immigrated during 1861-1864), while the Union naval blockade halted most immigration to Southern states throughout the war.

Of the 25 largest cities in the US in 1860, only three were in seceding states: No. 6, New Orleans, LA; No. 22, Charleston, SC; and No. 25, Richmond, VA.

Because of advances in public schooling, only 6% of free adults in the North were illiterate in 1860. In the South public schooling had not yet made wide inroads, and the failure was reflected in Southern literacy rates- nearly 50% of free Southern adults were illiterate in 1860.

II. Civil War Era Agriculture

Cultivated Land:

North: 105,000,000 acres

South: 57,000,000 acres

Cash Value of Farms, Farm Dwellings, Livestock, & Farm Equipment:

North: $5,056,151,204

South: $1,579,349,508

Cash Value of Farm Implements, Machinery, & Livestock:

North: $930,413,926

South: $397,072,820

Amount of Farm Equipment per Agricultural Worker:

North: $66.00

South: $38.00

Percentage of Labor Force Engaged in Agriculture:

North: 40%

South: 84%

Farm production in the North actually increased during the war, in spite of the loss of thousands of farmers to the Union Army. Bumper crops in 1861 and 1862 actually meant that food was exported by the North in large quantities. The number of hogs butchered yearly in Chicago increased from 270,000 in 1861 to 900,000 in 1865. New farm machinery like mowers, horse rakes, separators, sowers, cultivators, and drills allowed farm wives to manage many of the chores that had recently required the physical strength of one or more men to accomplish. The US Department of Agriculture was formed during the war to help farmers produce larger crops with less labor.

Principal southern crops were cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugar. Continuous planting of cotton and tobacco tended to wear out the soil, leading to nitrogen depletion and lower crop yields. Also, the two major crops, cotton and tobacco, were not edible, and the Union blockade hindered Southern efforts to use exports of those crops to secure funds necessary to purchase war materials. The cotton-producing states kept only 5% of their crops for use by Southern mills- 70% was exported, mostly to England, and 25% was sent to mills in the North. Middlemen skimmed part of the profit right off the top, for insurance, warehousing, and shipping. The role of middlemen didn't stop there, of course- cotton goods being returned from English mills were usually sent to Northern ports, then shipped from there by rail to Southern markets.

[Sources of statistics and bibliography included in last installment of this article.]